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A GRAND THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW?
Erwin Chemerinsky*

A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF
By Jeb Rubenfeld. New Haven: Yale University Press.
2001. Pp. 255. $35.

FREEDOM AND TIME:
GOVERNMENT.

Jeb Rubenfeld's book is nothing if not ambitious.1 In just 250
pages, Rubenfeld seeks to: justify the authority of the Constitution, es
tablish the legitimacy of judicial review, resolve the counter
majoritarian difficulty, offer a method of constitutional interpretation
and judicial review, uphold the constitutionality of affirmative action,
and explain the legitimacy of judicial protection of privacy, including
abortion rights. Scattered throughout the book, he offers philosophical
insights as to the meaning of life, discussing a central issue for all of us:
dealing with time. Rubenfeld's book is elegant, relying on history,2
continental philosophy,3 game theory,4 and even Supreme Court cases,
to support his theory.
As a reader, I very much want for Rubenfeld to succeed. I agree
with almost all of his conclusions.5 No doubt, it would be wonderful to
have a theory that resolves the counter-majoritarian difficulty, justifies
nonoriginalist judicial review, and supports affirmative action and
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science,
University of Southern California. B.S. 1975, Northwestern; J.D. 1978, Harvard. - Ed.

1 . Jeb Rubenfeld is the Slaughter Professor of Law at Yale Law School.

2. See, e.g., pp. 22-24.
3. See, e.g., pp. 34-41, 147-48 (discussing Habermas), 9-10, 75-76 (discussing Derrida),
234-43 (discussing Foucault).
4. See, e.g., pp. 27-28, 102-15 (discussing Kenneth Arrow and the application of his theo
rem to law).
5. I disagree with only some of his conclusions. For example, Rubenfeld says that he
does not think that there should be constitutional protection for the right to marry.
P. 245. As one who believes that the liberty of the due process clause safeguards fundamen
tal rights relating to privacy and personhood, I disagree and believe that the right to marry
properly has been safeguarded by the Court as a fundamental right. See, e.g. , Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1974); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (constitutional protection
of the right to marry). More importantly, I disagree with Rubenfeld's conception of strict
scrutiny. I see strict scrutiny as a form of balancing, with the weights on the scales being set
against the government's action. Rubenfeld, as part of his paradigm case method of constitu
tional interpretation, sees strict scrutiny as absolutely prohibiting certain government actions
and justifications. Pp. 202-03. I discuss Rubenfeld's paradigm case method of interpretation
in Section 11.C, below.
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abortion rights. If Rubenfeld succeeded, progressive law professors
could forever retire from engaging in constitutional theory, except to
refine, apply, and defend his approach.
And if this is not enough, Rubenfeld claims to accomplish this by
rejecting all of the constitutional theories that have been previously
developed. The book jacket quotes Bruce Ackerman as stating, "This
brilliant book heralds a new era in constitutional thought."
Unfortunately, if Rubenfeld's claims seem too good to be true, it is
because they are. On careful examination, many key steps in
Rubenfeld's argument have serious problems. Some aspects of
Rubenfeld's analysis are simply rephrasings of familiar arguments in
constitutional theory. Others, such as his "paradigm case" theory of
judicial review, are so inadequately developed as to be of little help in
understanding how courts should decide cases.
Rubenfeld's book is similar to efforts by Albert Einstein and other
famous physicists to develop a "unified" theory accounting for all
physical forces. Even Einstein failed at this effort and most physicists
seem skeptical that a "unified field" theory ever can be developed.
Likewise, reading Rubenfeld's book heightens my skepticism that
there ever can be a grand theory of constitutional law of the sort he
seeks.
Part I of this Review summarizes Rubenfeld's thesis and his argu
ments. Part II considers the key steps in Rubenfeld's argument and
the problems with it. Finally, Part III concludes by offering final
thoughts about the role of constitutional theory.
I.

RUBENFELD'S THESIS

At the risk of oversimplifying, I see six major steps in Rubenfeld's
analysis.
(1) The traditional approach to constitutional law is "speech ori
ented," meaning defining democracy as having government follow the
voices of the current majority of society. Rubenfeld argues that society
is obsessed with living in the present. He says that "[t]he proliferation
of the imperative to live in the present . . . can be seen in a wide vari
ety of modem practices, institutions, styles, and literatures" (p. 26). He
says that in the realm of government this means that democracy is un
derstood as the imperative for government to follow the will of the
current majority of society. This is what he means by "speech ori
ented." Rubenfeld writes that "a . . . predominant conception of self
govemment . . . call[ed] speech-modeled of which the organizing term
is government by the present will or voice of the governed" (p. 74). He
says that "[t]he idea that the earth belongs to the living would have us
govern ourselves by our own present will" (p. 143). In other words,
Rubenfeld finds the definition of democracy as majority rule as de-
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rived from a focus on the current majority and the need to follow its
voice.
(2) A "speech-oriented" approach to constitutional law creates the
counter-majoritarian difficulty. Four decades ago, Alexander Bickel
wrote of judicial review being a deviant institution in American soci
ety.6 Bickel wrote of the counter-majoritarian difficulty: constitutional
judicial review involves unelected judges striking down the choices by
popularly elected legislatures.7 If democracy is defined as majority rule
- or as Rubenfeld puts it, if government is thought of in "speech"
terms - judicial review is inherently at odds with democracy.
Countless books and articles have been written about this, includ
ing many that offer their own solutions to reconciling judicial review
with democracy. Originalists, for example, argue that their theory is
best because it limits the situations in which courts usurp the popular
will to only those situations where the Constitution's text and intent
are clear.8 Perhaps most famously, John Hart Ely's book Democracy
and Distrust begins on page one by defining democracy as majority
rule and then purports to reconcile judicial review with it by having
courts focus on perfecting the processes of government.9
Rubenfeld argues that every model of judicial review is fatally
flawed because it is founded on a speech-oriented approach.
Rubenfeld reviews major approaches - social contract analysis, origi
nalism, proceduralism, consent theory, and liberalism - and shows
how none succeeds in solving the· counter-majoritarian difficulty. He
says that the "antimony built into the very logic of the speech-modeled
ideal of self-government makes that ideal presuppose what it cannot
accept: the presence of texts, enacted in the past, governing the polity
on fundamental matters of justice today and in the future" (p. 75).
(3) The Constitution instead should be seen as a written commitment
over time. Rubenfeld sees his alternative view of the Constitution as
being about enduring commitments, and he derives this from the fact
that the document is written. He writes:
Self-government cannot be an exercise merely of freedom of speech and
all that

freedom of speech

entails (political dialogue, formation of the

'public will, ' responsiveness of the representatives to the 'voice of the
people.') Self-government requires an inscriptive politics, a politics that
exercises the

freedom to write,

a politics oriented around the production

6. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962).
7. Id. at 16-20.
8. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); ROBERT BORK,
SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE
(1996); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971).
9. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DiSTRUST (1980).
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and enforcement of a democratic text laying down principles and institu

86)
He says that the Constitution is a "conception of self-government
as living out, over time, commitments of one's own authorship"
(p. 14). Later he explains this by stating: "[T]he defining th.esis of self
government on the model of writing [is] the self that governs itself
over time is governed by commitments of its own making, apart from
or even contrary to its will at any given moment" (p. 92).
In other words, there are three basic elements to Rubenfeld's con
ception of the Constitution: it is a commitment; it is expressed in
writing; and it is meant to last over time. He discusses, in detail, types
of commitments that people make. He explains the importance of a
written, as opposed to a speech-based approach to government. Un
like a speech-founded orientation, which is committed to following the
will of the present majority, a written Constitution is not so oriented.
Most importantly, he says that understanding the Constitution re
quires that it be seen as extending over time and thus transcending the
present-oriented approach to government that he earlier criticizes. In
deed, a central focus of his book concerns time and how focusing on it
changes our understanding of the Constitution.
(4) Viewing the Constitution as written warrants its existence, justi
fies judicial review, and solves the counter-majoritarian difficulty. The
obvious objection to Rubenfeld's argument is that those who are now
alive did not ratify the Constitution. Why should they be seen as hav
ing made the commitment that he describes? This is particularly im
portant because Rubenfeld criticizes those who have described the
Constitution as an effort of society to tie its hands so that short-term
impulses do not cause a compromise of long-term values.10 Some, such
as Jon Elster, have used the story of Ulysses and the Sirens, where
Ulysses had his hands tied to the mast to prevent him from indulging
in the desire to follow the Siren song, as a metaphor for the
Constitution.11 Rubenfeld, though, says that the problem with this
view is that those now alive did not choose to tie themselves to this
mast; it was a choice made by past generations and what right do they
have to tie future ones? (pp. 93-94). Moreover, Rubenfeld argues that
the analogy to Ulysses does not provide a normative reason why the
commitment should be honored (pp. 1 16-17).
But why doesn't Rubenfeld's conception of commitment and a
written constitution run afoul of the same problems? He says that it is
because there is such a thing as the American "people" that exists
over time (p. 131). Of course, the individuals change, as they die and
tions for generations to come. (p.

10. See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H: TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18-23 (3d ed.
2000).
11. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 94-96 (1984).
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new persons move ·in and are born. But Rubenfeld says that even a
single person changes; he writes that "we are composed of many dif
ferent selves not at a particular moment, but over time" (p. 131).
Rubenfeld says that just as an individual changes, but retains his or her
status as a person, so can "people" change, but retain a common unity.
He says "the way we solve the problem of unity of the subject over
time, in the case of persons, is by recognizing that human subjects oc
cupy time as well as space . . . . The idea of human-being as being
over-time completes the work necessary to situate commitment to
human freedom" (pp. 139-40).
Therefore, since there is an American people - of which we are
all a part - and it has committed itself to the Constitution, we, in the
present generation, have done so too. This commitment is not just
made by those in the past, but by a timeless "people" of which we are
a part. In a particularly important passage, Rubenfeld writes: "Today
we are all Jews and blacks; we are all minorities infesting a region that
others wish they could have for themselves. We are also members of a
historical people taking part in that nation's sins and glories" (p. 159).
Rubenfeld says that this justifies judicial review because it exists to
uphold and enforce our own commitments. He says that
"[c]onstitutional interpretation cannot be vested in organs of govern
ment beholden to or expressing popular will" (p. 173). He says that
the judiciary is "the only branch positioned to exercise the interpretive
power in such a way as to avoid collapsing into an exercise of present
democratic will" (pp. 172-73).
Rubenfeld argues that this conception of the Constitution solves
the counter-majoritarian difficulty because it is our own commitment
that is the basis for invalidating laws conflicting with the Constitution.
He boldly proclaims that "[c]onstitutionalism as democracy undoes all
of the theoretical perplexities that have so confounded contemporary
constitutional thought" (p. 163). He says that understanding the
Constitution as our own commitment eliminates the need to see judi
cial review as a deviant institution in American society. He writes:
"The cardinal rule of this interpretive task is that interpretation of
commitments cannot be permitted to collapse into governance by the
self's present will. In saying what commitments require, we are obliged
not to rationalize our way, under guise of 'interpretation,' to whatever
we wanted to do in the first place" (p. 173).
(5) In interpreting the Constitution, courts should follow the "para
digm case method." Rubenfeld says that his view of the Constitution
leads to a new way of thinking of judicial review; he terms this the
"paradigm case method." He explains this by stating:
Rules and concepts can take on meaning by reference to their "paradigm
case": their central or most clearly established instances .... "Paradigm
cases" are so called because they do paradigmatic duty. They furnish
fixed points of reference. They are the exemplars, the building blocks,
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out of which doctrine is to be built. (pp. 180-81)

Rubenfeld does not claim that the paradigm case method will offer
determinative answers in most constitutional cases. He says, though,
that it often will "rule out" a proposed interpretation of the Constitu
tion (p. 194). He applies his paradigm case method to justify the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. 12
Rubenfeld says that no other theory of constitutional interpretation
can justify Brown. He says, though, that if the Fourteenth Amendment
is understood as being about eliminating the black codes in the South
that followed the Civil War, then Brown follows from this paradigm.
He writes: "The paradigm case method holds that the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment is secured, and its proper interpretation
shaped, by the paradigmatic instance of its application" (p. 182). He
says that the paradigm case of the Fourteenth Amendment is an anti
caste principle and that laws mandating segregation of the races run
afoul of it.
(6) Application of the paradigm case method justifies the constitu
tionality of affirmative action and judicial protection of privacy, in
cluding abortion rights. In the last two chapters of the book,
Rubenfeld applies his theory to particular, controversial constitutional
issues. In Chapter Eleven, he considers sex discrimination and race
preferences. Initially, he explains why the equal protection clause is
properly understood as prohibiting sex discrimination, even though
this was not within the intent of the provision's drafters (pp. 197-99).
He then tackles the harder topic: the constitutional permissibility of
affirmative action.
He begins by makirig the powerful point that the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment endorsed affirmative action efforts. He notes:
The judges and scholars who most prominently oppose affirmative ac
tion, saying that 'the government may not make distinctions on the basis
of race, ' are the very .same ones who supposedly champion the jurispru
dence of original understanding. But here, without excuse, without a
word of explanation, they adopt a highly unoriginalist position, and they
ought at least to be candid in doing so.13

Rubenfeld argues that the equal protection clause, under his para
digm case method, is about stopping purposeful discrimination against
minorities. Affirmative action, to benefit minorities, does not offend
this conception of equal protection. Indeed, Rubenfeld writes: "Some
thing has gone profoundly wrong in constitutional interpretation when
the Fourteenth Amendment is read, as it is today, to make racial mi-

12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. P. 202. This is a point that was developed in. Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Gov
ernment's Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. REV.
477 (1998).
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norities virtually the only minorities in our entire legal system that
cannot be singled out for favorable treatment" (p. 218).
Finally, Chapter Twelve presents Rubenfeld's views of constitu
tional interpretation with regard to privacy and particularly abortion
rights. Rubenfeld argues that the Constitution should be understood
as containing an "anti-totalitarian right of privacy" - "a right of each
person not to have a particular life imposed on him" (p. 239).
Rubenfeld argues that from this perspective laws prohibiting abortion
are unconstitutional because such laws have "invasive, far-reaching
prescriptive, indeed conscriptive effects. It compels this woman to
bear a child. It forces motherhood upon her" (p. 225). Rubenfeld
maintains that statutes prohibiting abortion go further than any other
law in their "conscriptive, life-occupying effects" (p. 225).
Thus, in just 250 pages Rubenfeld covers everything from the rea
sons for having a Constitution to how it should be interpreted to the
resolution of the most controversial issues such as affirmative action
and abortion. The argument is logically structured, though the book is
not an easy read; the writing is dense and often abstract. I found my
self having to read some passages several times to try to understand
Rubenfeld's points.
II.

WHAT DOES RU B ENFEL D ADD TO CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY?

Professor Rubenfeld's book is unquestionably impressive in his
weaving together continental philosophy, economic game theory, and
history to justify his conclusions. He invents a new vocabulary, such ·as
the distinction between a "speech" orientation and a "written" orien
tation and_ his "paradigm case method of interpretation." His progres
sive conclusions make it appealing - at least for liberals - to say that
he's got it right.
But, on reflection, the theory is not nearly as original or as effec
tive as Professor Rubenfeld purports. First, although he is right to
challenge the definition of democracy as majority rule, this is not new
and it is not aided by drawing a distinction between "speech" and
"written" views. Second, Rubenfekl's conception of commitment fails
for the same reason he criticizes others: people today did not commit
themselves to the Constitution. His artificial construct of a unified
American "people" - which is the crucial step in his argument does not wo_rk on a theoretical or practical level. Third, the paradigm
case method of constitutional interpretation is just another way of
phrasing "modified originalism" - constitutional interpretation
should be true to the central goal for each provision, even though it
need not follow the particular views of the drafters (even if they could
be known). As Dworkin put it, for each constitutional principle there
is a central concept that should be followed, but there is not the need
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to adhere to the specific conceptions of the Framers.14 Rubenfeld's
paradigm case method seems little different than this, except that it is
not as clearly explained. I will consider each of these points individu
ally.
A. Judicial Review and the Meaning of Democracy
If democracy is defined as majority rule, no theory can succeed in
solving the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Unelected federal judges
invalidating the actions of popularly elected officials is inherently at
odds with majority rule. It does not matter whether the court is fol
lowing an originalist or a nonoriginalist philosophy; either way, a judi
ciary that is not electorally accountable is striking down the choices of
elected officials. Under originalist review, this may occur less often,
but when it happens, it is no less at odds with majority rule.
As I have argued at length elsewhere, the problem with the obses
sion with the counter-majoritarian difficulty is that it is based on a
misdefinition of democracy as majority rule.15 Neither descriptively
nor normatively is majority rule a proper definition of American de
mocracy. Descriptively, the Constitution does not reflect a commit
ment to majority rule. There is no provision within the Constitution
for national referenda or initiatives to allow the majority to be in
volved in government decisionmaking. There never has been anything
at the federal level like the initiative process that exists in many states
to allow the majority to vote on laws.
The reason for this is simple: the Framers of the Constitution were
deeply distrustful of pure majority rule. The Federalist Papers, for ex
ample, repeatedly emphasize the dangers of unchecked majority rule.16
The Constitution they created, for the most part, rejects majority rule.
The President is chosen by the electoral college, not the popular vote
of the people. The result, of course, is that today - like a few times
earlier in American history - we have a president who received fewer
popular votes than his prime opponent. Senators initially were se
lected by state legislatures and even today the allocation of two sena
tors per state ensures that the Senate is not representative of the ma
jority of the population. Federal judges are chosen by the President
and approved by the Senate, with no direct role for the people. It is
impossible descriptively to see this structure of government as re14. RO NALD DWORKI N, TAKI NG RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1978).
15. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HAR V. L. REV.
43, 74-77 (1989); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on
Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEXAS L. RE V. 1207, 1211-26 (1984). See
generally ERWI N CHEMERI NSKY, INTERPRETI NG THE CO NSTITUTIO N (1987).
16. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 15-16, at 78-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST, supra, No. 49, at 281-85 (James Madison).
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fleeting a commitment to democracy defined as majority rule. The
very existence of the Bill of Rights was to put limits on the majority's
ability to restrict individual freedom. Justice Robert Jackson put this
eloquently when he wrote:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts. One 's right to life, liberty, and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote: they depend on the
outcome of no election.17

Nor normatively is such a conception desirable. The United States
should be understood as a constitutional democracy, a system where
the choices of the majority and their elected officials are allowed only
so long as they are consistent with the Constitution. The definition of
American democracy thus s.hould include both a belief in majority rule
and also a commitment to protecting fundamental values - such as
fundamental rights, equality, and separation of powers - from the
majority.18 Normatively, it is desirable to have a conception of democ
racy that focuses on both the processes of government and the sub
stantive values that the Constitution protects.
If democracy is understood this way, then judicial review safe
guarding rights or advancing equality is actually consistent with
American democracy. Put another way, the Constitution itself is in
consistent with defining democracy as majority rule because the
Constitution is an inherently anti-majoritarian document. No one alive
today voted for it and a majority cannot change it. Judicial review en
forcing an anti-majoritarian document always will be anti
majoritarian. But isn't it peculiar, inaccurate, and undesirable to de
fine American "democracy" in a way that makes the Constitution it
self seem deviant? If instead the very definition of democracy includes
the Constitution, then judicial review enforcing it is consistent, and not
at odds, with democracy.
Rubenfeld essentially makes this point when he argues that de
mocracy should not be defined as the voice of current majorities. He
notes that "in a society that aspires to governance by the present voice
of the people, this self-addressed self-written law, the one that marks
the day of every legitimate popular assembly, is foundationally prob
lematic" (p. 77). He thus argues that the conception of democracy

17. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
18. Mark Tushnet has powerfully developed this point: "Such a view of democracy has
seemed inadequate to most political theorists, who argue that democracy, properly con
ceived, requires the protection of some fundamental but nonpolitical rights." MARK
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AN D BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71
(1988).
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cannot be based on the speech model which focuses on having the
government follow the views of the majority. He argues instead that
the proper understanding of the Constitution is as a written commit
ment.
This distinction between a "speech"-oriented view and a "written"oriented view is at the very core of Rubenfeld's argument. But I do
not see what it adds to attacking the definition of democracy as ma
jority rule. In fact, a distinction between the spoken and written word
seems inherently arbitrary. Why should so much depend on the way in
which the communication occurs? Both spoken and written forms of
communication can be about following the views of the current ma
jority and either could also be about forming an enduring commit
ment. Binding commitments can be made orally and writings need not
be binding over time. Statutes are in writing, but they can be changed
by a majority of the current legislature at any point in time.
In other words, the appropriate distinction is between democracy
defined as majority rule and democracy defined to include the endur
ing commitments contained in the Constitution. I think that the latter
is preferable, both descriptively and normatively to the former, but I
don't see what is added by labeling these "speech" as opposed to
"writing."
B. Is There an Enduring American "People"?
My strongest criticism of Rubenfeld's book is his reliance on a fic
tional concept of an American people that transcends time to justify
the Constitution and judicial review and to resolve the counter
majoritarian difficulty. Rubenfeld's argument that the Constitution
should be seen as a "commitment" is not new. Many have developed
this argument.19 For example, as Rubenfeld recognizes, many have
analogized the Constitution to the story of Ulysses having himself
bound to the mast so as to not be tempted by the Siren songs that
lured sailors to their death on the rocky shoals.20 Rubenfeld quotes
Stephen Holmes's characterization of this: "A constitution is Peter so
ber while the electorate is Peter drunk. Citizens need a constitution,
just as Ulysses needed to be bound to his mast."21
Rubenfeld says, though, that "the venerable Ulyssean analogy is
inapt and misleading" (p. 116). But how is Rubenfeld's theory differ
ent from the Ulysses analogy? He says: "[T]he point on which I want
19. See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 11, at 94-96; TRIBE, supra note 10, at 18-24; Thomas C.
Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J. ECON. & ORO. 357 (1985).
20. The story is from Homer, The Odyssey, Book XII, lines 141-200 (Harper Colophon
ed. 1975). The analogy to the Constitution is most developed in ELSTER, supra note 1 1 .
21. P . 1 1 6 n.26 (quoting STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE
THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 135 (1995)).
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to focus is this: nowhere in this story of reason and passion does
Ulysses's action of self-binding provide him with a reason to act"
(pp. 1 16-17). Rubenfeld elaborates: "The ropes that hold Ulysses
when he hears the Sirens explain why he stays on board the ship in a
causal sense; they do not supply a reason in a normative sense" (p.
1 17).
This argument, however, is problematic because the normative
reason for adhering to the commitment seems clear: it is desirable to
make certain choices in advance and then adhere to them to avoid an
ticipated harms. For Ulysses, this was the choice to avoid death, while
still being able to hear the Siren song, by having himself tied to the
mast. The normative desirability of this is obvious. The Constitution
allows society to protect its long-term commitments and precious val
ues from its anticipated short-term impulses to compromise them.
Rubenfeld also says that "Ulyssean pre-commitment appeals to ra
tionality as against the seduction of transient passion. Commitment
appeals to passion as against the seduction of rationality - of every
day, cost-benefit, preference-maximizing rationality" (p. 129; emphasis
omitted). But this seems an arbitrary and false distinction. In making
commitments (or pre-commitments), there can be both passion and
rationality. Marriage, an example frequently used by Rubenfeld to il
lustrate the concept of commitment, would, for most people, include
both. Likewise, the commitment (or pre-commitment) found in the
Constitution makes it difficult for us to later change our mind for rea
sons of either passion or rationality. Again, this is like being married,
which may cause us to stay in a relationship evenwhen passions or ra
tional self-interest might point us to other choices.
Rubenfeld distinguishes his approach to commitment from the
Ulysses analogy, and ultimately defends much of his theory, by con
tending that there is an on-going American "people" of which we are
all a part. He says that "a people might be regarded as a collective
agent, persisting over time, able to make and to live under its own
commitments" (p. 93). He says that "[c]ommitmentarian democracy
holds that a people, understood as an agent existing over time, across
generations, is the proper subject of democratic self-government"
(p. 145). He argues that just as a person changes over time, but still
remains the same individual, so can a "people" change but remain a
single entity. He writes: "To recognize a people as a subject persisting
over time, despite the heterogeneity of its composition, is ultimately
no more mystical than recognizing individuals as subjects persisting
over time despite the heterogeneity of their composition" (p. 158).
This concept of an American "people" does great work in
Rubenfeld's theory. It goes to his central thesis about the role of time;
he sees a people that transcends time and does not simply exist at a
particular moment. The notion of a "people" also provides an easy an-
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swer to the counter-majoritarian difficulty: the Constitution, then, is
our commitment, and enforcing it is not contrary to our will.
Although the notion of an enduring "people" is romantic, it
doesn't work because it is purely a fictional construct. The vast major
ity of those present today did not have ancestors here at the founding.
Professor Tribe puts this well when he writes: "For it is not we, but
people who are long dead who tied us to this mast - not an alien spe
cies, to be sure, but not ourselves either . . . . For the truth is that we as
individuals are likely to have written, and voted to ratify, not a single
word of the document to which we swear allegiance as the
Constitution of the United States."22 Native Americans who were pre
sent were excluded from participation, as were women, blacks, and
others. Rubenfeld must assume a degree of homogeneity, of some
sort, among people engaged in the framing and people now that defies
reality.
To be fair, Rubenfeld recognizes this when he states: "There is and
always will be something intensely self-delusive in the suggestion that
"Americans" compose a single people engaged in a protracted,
centuries-long struggle for self-government. This delusion inevitably
helps suppress everything we know about America's mistreatment of
those excluded, now as well as then, from the Constitution's 'People.'
The exclusion of a majority of persons from the constitution-making
processes of the 1780s will always eat away at America's legitimacy"
(p. 158).
But Rubenfeld brushes this aside by saying that over time there
became an American "people." He says: "But if a nation had to be
born at a single founding moment, it could never be born at all"
(p. 158). He then writes, in a key passage justifying his concept of an
American people: "Today we are all Jews and blacks; we are all mi
norities infesting a region that others wish they could have for them
selves. We are all members of a historical people, taking part in that
nation's sins and glory" (p. 159).
Again, it sounds romantic, but it also seems clearly wrong. We are
not all Jews and we are not all black - not in a fictional sense and cer
tainly not in a real sense. Individuals are often treated differently be
cause of their race or ethnicity and as a result they often experience
the world differently. As I drive down the streets of Los Angeles, I am
not going to be stopped by its police officers solely because of my race,
but those with black or brown skin very well may be stopped. Indeed,
because of our different experiences, we often will view constitutional
issues differently. Rubenfeld, of course, would not deny this; he would
say that it does not refute that there is such a thing as the American
"people."
22. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 24.
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But this then· becomes entirely an argument from definition.
Rubenfeld defines an enduring "American people" and then uses that
definition to great advantage in explaining why a commitment over
time is desirable. The problem is that the definition seems so at odds
with reality. To use the simplest example, contrary to what Rubenfeld
says, we are not and never all will be Jews or blacks or minorities. In a
nation as divided as America, now and historically, it is fictional to de
fine the country as consisting of a unitary people persisting over time.
C. A Method of Constitutional Interpretation
Rubenfeld's book also describes his approach to interpreting the
Constitution: "the paradigm case method" (p. 178). He says that for
every constitutional provision there is a "paradigm case" and that
courts should discern and reason from it in deciding constitutional
cases. He writes: "This method takes as foundational only commit
ments - and more specifically, only those commitments made in the
course of the historical struggles that actuated the Founder's
constitution-writing" (pp. 186-87).
However, Rubenfeld's description of the paradigm case method is
unfortunately very sketchy. For example, Rubenfeld never explains
how a court is to determine the paradigm case for a particular consti
tutional provision. Equally important, Rubenfeld never explains the
appropriate level of abstraction to use in stating a paradigm case. An
originalist might use Framers' intent to define the paradigm case and
then state it at a very narrow level of abstraction. For example, an
originalist might see the paradigm case for the equal protection clause
as protecting former slaves from discrimination, thus excluding the
protection of other groups. Rubenfeld sees the paradigm case for the
equal protection clause as eliminating the black codes (p. 182). But
how is the choice to be made as to which is the better "paradigm
case?" Rubenfeld never explains. Nor is there any explanation as to
how courts are to use the paradigm case method, even assuming that a
paradigm case can be discerned.
Rubenfeld's paradigm case method seems very similar to "abstract
originalism" - the idea that courts should follow the Framer's general
goal for each constitutional provision, but need not adhere to their
specific views. This was captured in Dworkin's notion that there is a
"concept" for every constitutional provision that should be followed,
but that the specific "conceptions" of the Framers need not be con
trolling.23 Paul Brest termed this approach "moderate originalism."24
Although Rubenfeld uses different terminology, there does not seem
23. DWORKI N, supra note 14, at 134-36.
24. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. RE V.
204, 205 (1980).
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to be any meaningful difference between his approach and the earlier
descriptions.25
Of course, every court interpreting the Constitution thinks that
what it is doing is consistent with the concept behind a constitutional
provision.26 Each could articulate a "paradigm case," at some level of
abstraction, to justify any conclusion.27 Absent any description of how
to derive and assess a paradigm case, Rubenfeld's approach adds little
except a new phrase.
III.

THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

I confess to being a skeptic as to whether there ever will be a uni
fied theory of constitutional law that answers all of the questions that
Professor Rubenfeld addresses. Indeed, Professor Rubenfeld's effort
makes me even more doubtful.
Ultimately, the purpose of constitutional theory is to give guidance
as to how courts should interpret the Constitution in specific cases.
But no overarching theory can answer, or give guidance as to how to
answer, the hard questions of constitutional law. Consider a few ex
amples from recent Supreme Court decisions. Does sovereign immu
nity bar suits against unconsenting state governments in state courts?28
Should the First Amendment protect the media's broadcasting of a
tape of a conversation illegally intercepted and recorded if it concerns
a matter of public importance?29 Is the execution of the mentally re
tarded cruel and unusual punishment?30
I do not see how any desirable constitutional theory can answer
these questions. Each inescapably involves a value choice - whether
to favor immunity over accountability, whether to favor speech over
25. The same criticisms that could be advanced at all nonoriginalist (or moderate origi
nalist) constitutional interpretation could be directed at Rubenfeld's theory: the lack of any
significant constraint on the judges. I share Rubenfeld's belief in nonoriginalist judicial re
view so I do not mean to criticize him for this. But it is surprising that Rubenfeld makes no
attempt to answer this· argument, which conservative constitutional theorists undoubtedly
would make in response to his theory.
26. Tribe, for example , speaks of "the inescapability of moderate originalism." TRIBE,
10, at 51.

supra note

27. Nor does Rubenfeld address the key question in any theory of constitutional inter
pretation: the level of abstraction at which a principle is to be stated. See LAURENCE TRIBE
& MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991) (discussing the importance of
the choice of the level of abstraction).
28. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that state governments cannot be sued
in state court, even on federal claims, without their consent).
29. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (noting the First Amendment precludes the
imposition of civil liability for using or disclosing the contents of illegally intercepted com
munications on a person who was not involved in the interception, but who knew or had rea
son to know that the inte_rception was unlawful).
_
30. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
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privacy, whether to protect the individual or the state's choice of pun
ishment. Deciding each of these questions - like almost all constitu
tional issues - requires making a value choice. There is no way to
avoid that.
Some, such as originalists, may try to hide their choices in the cloak
of a claimed neutral methodology. But as many have shown, origi
nalists are making value choices and simply masking them in the lan
guage of Framers' intent. As Dworkin said, there is not a Framers' in
tent out there to be discovered; it is created and the creator does so in
a way to advance his or her value choices. Think of Justice Antonin
Scalia: he finds in his theory of original meaning a Constitution that
forbids affirmative action, allows bans on abortion, permits school
prayer and aid to parochial schools. Surely it is not coincidence that
these also happen to be his, and other conservatives', political views.
Constitutional decisionmaking is all about value choices. Should
equal protection be seen as prohibiting government-mandated segre
gation? This is not answered in the text or the Framers' intent or by
paradigm cases or any other theory of constitutional interpretation.
Brown v. Board of Education was a value choice. In allowing the Boy
Scouts to exclude gays, the Supreme Court made a value choice to fa
vor the group's right to make discriminatory choices over the right of
gays to be free from discrimination. Plain and simple, that's what Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale was about.31 Every time the Court balances,
such as in deciding what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
or in deciding whether intermediate or strict scrutiny is met, a value
choice is being made.
This is not to say that there is no role or importance for constitu
tional theory. Constitutional theory can explain why it is desirable to
have an institution, like the judiciary, making value choices.
Rubenfeld's book offers such an explanation in describing the impor
tance of making and adhering to commitments over time. But consti
tutional theory cannot avoid the need for courts to make value choices
in deciding cases. Nor ·Can constitutional theory provide the content
for those value choices. That should be the primary focus of constitu
tional scholarship: debating and illuminating the value choices that
courts should make in interpreting the Constitution.
CONCLUSION

I liked Professor Rubenfeld's book more than may seem from this
Review. I was dazzled by his ability to integrate continental philoso
phy, modern economics, and social psychology, among other disci
plines, into a theory of constitutional law. I was awed by his auda
ciousness in claiming to reject all prior constitutional theories and
31. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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develop his own and to try to accomplish so many tasks in such a short
book. I learned a great deal from this book.
Yet, in the end, I was frustrated by the book because although I
wanted him to succeed, it just isn't possible. There is not a grand the
ory of constitutional law that can justify the Constitution's existence,
warrant the existence of judicial review, resolve the counter
majoritarian difficulty, offer a method of judicial interpretation, and
support affirmative action and abortion rights. Not today, not ever.

